feat(security): Yerin security-agent toolset (read-only)

New securityRegistry (separate from companionRegistry) with two read-only,
secret-free tools for the Yerin security agent:
- audit_log: query the redacted audit trail by actor_kind/actor_id
- agent_inventory: list agents + capabilities/scopes (explicit projection,
  never SELECT *, no token material)

Follows the existing createRegistry() pattern. Design + wiring roadmap in
docs/yerin-security-agent.md. Not yet seeded/exposed over MCP (left for review).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
root
2026-06-01 23:26:46 +10:00
parent 459a7749c9
commit 6c393d8069
4 changed files with 121 additions and 0 deletions

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import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll } from 'vitest';
import { pool } from '../../lib/db/pool.js';
import { resetDb } from '../helpers/db.js';
import { migrateUp } from '../../lib/db/migrate.js';
import { securityRegistry } from '../../lib/ai/agent/tools/security/index.js';
import * as agentsRepo from '../../lib/db/repos/agents.js';
import { recordAudit } from '../../lib/db/repos/audit.js';
// Yerin's security toolset: read-only observability over the audit trail and
// the agent privilege inventory. No mutations, no secret values.
const owner = { kind: 'user', id: null };
let watchedAgent;
beforeAll(async () => {
await resetDb();
await migrateUp();
watchedAgent = await agentsRepo.create({
slug: `sec-watch-${Date.now()}`, name: 'Watched', kind: 'claude', model: 'sonnet',
capabilities: { read: true, suggest: true }, scopes: {}
}, owner);
});
describe('securityRegistry', () => {
it('registers read-only tools with valid descriptors', () => {
const names = securityRegistry.listTools().map(t => t.name).sort();
expect(names).toContain('audit_log');
expect(names).toContain('agent_inventory');
for (const t of securityRegistry.listTools()) {
expect(t.name).toBeTruthy();
expect(t.description).toBeTruthy();
expect(t.input_schema.type).toBe('object');
expect(typeof t.handler).toBe('function');
}
});
});
describe('audit_log tool', () => {
it('returns recent audit entries, newest first, filterable by actor_kind', async () => {
await recordAudit({ kind: 'agent', id: watchedAgent.id }, 'create', 'task', null, null, { title: 'x' });
const tool = securityRegistry.getTool('audit_log');
const { entries } = await tool.handler({ actor_kind: 'agent', limit: 5 }, {});
expect(Array.isArray(entries)).toBe(true);
expect(entries.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(entries.every(e => e.actor_kind === 'agent')).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('agent_inventory tool', () => {
it('lists agents with their privilege level and never exposes token material', async () => {
const tool = securityRegistry.getTool('agent_inventory');
const { agents } = await tool.handler({}, {});
const found = agents.find(a => a.id === watchedAgent.id);
expect(found).toBeTruthy();
expect(found.capabilities).toEqual({ read: true, suggest: true });
// defense-in-depth: no secret/token field may leak through this view
const blob = JSON.stringify(agents).toLowerCase();
expect(blob).not.toContain('token_hash');
expect(blob).not.toContain('password');
});
});