chore: 2.0.0-alpha.9 — security & correctness hardening (Void 3.0 quick wins)

- Q3: prod void DB role NOSUPERUSER (vector marked trusted; deploy/README documents it)
- Q4: buildChildEnv allow-list for the claude subprocess (no OWNER_TOKEN/DATABASE_URL/secrets leak)
- Q5: pending-change approve claims-before-applying + reopens on failure (no re-approvable dup)
- Q6: /capture/upload validates space_id (UUID+existence); pg pool statement_timeout 30s
- Q9: disabled failing syncoid-donatello timer on Z

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
root
2026-06-03 07:54:57 +10:00
parent 1e1d0c539d
commit 925cb0d7d6
12 changed files with 150 additions and 11 deletions

View File

@@ -74,8 +74,17 @@ router.post('/:id/approve',
if (row.status !== 'pending') {
throw new ConflictError(`pending change is already ${row.status}`);
}
const entity_id = await applyPendingChange(row, req.actor);
// Claim atomically BEFORE applying: resolve() guards `WHERE status='pending'`,
// so a crash/retry can't double-apply (the create path would duplicate).
const resolved = await pendingRepo.resolve(req.params.id, 'approved', req.actor?.id ?? 'owner');
if (!resolved) throw new ConflictError('pending change is already resolved');
let entity_id;
try {
entity_id = await applyPendingChange(row, req.actor);
} catch (e) {
await pendingRepo.reopen(req.params.id); // un-claim so the owner can retry
throw e;
}
await audit.recordAudit(
req.actor, 'approve', row.entity_type, entity_id,
null, { pending_id: row.id, original_agent_id: row.agent_id, action: row.action }