feat(auth): capability check — user/cron/worker allow; agents tiered allow/suggest/deny
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docs/security-followups.md
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# Security Follow-ups for Plan 1
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Items flagged by the security review plugin that were deferred at the user's request
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("ease up on the security plugin") and are to be addressed in a consolidated pass
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before Plan 1 is declared complete.
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## Migration 005 (cross-cutting / polymorphic tables)
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The polymorphic shape (`entity_type` text + `entity_id` uuid, no composite FK to a
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parent) was an approved design decision in `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-31-void-v2-design.md`.
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That decision trades referential integrity at the DB layer for one shared join table
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across entity types. The plugin's findings are accurate but require revisiting the
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design choice — not a one-line fix.
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- **[HIGH] entity_tags / entity_links / attachments lack `space_id`.**
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Cross-tenant linkage is possible at the DB layer. Mitigation options:
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1. Add `space_id` NOT NULL to each polymorphic row; require callers to filter.
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2. Per-type junction tables (e.g. `page_tags`, `task_links`) with real FKs.
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- **[MEDIUM] `tags.name UNIQUE` is global, not per-space.** Cross-tenant collision
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creates a side-channel for tag-name discovery. Fix: `UNIQUE(space_id, name)`.
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- **[MEDIUM] No cascade on parent delete for `attachments` / `entity_tags`.**
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Polymorphic FKs cannot be expressed in standard SQL. Fix options as above, or
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a deletion trigger per parent type.
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## Decision pending
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Before closing Plan 1, decide whether to:
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- (a) **Tighten now**: add `space_id` columns + per-type composite FKs to `entity_tags`,
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`entity_links`, `attachments`, and a per-space UNIQUE on `tags`. Cost: ~1-2 hrs and
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invalidates the polymorphic claim in the spec.
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- (b) **Document and defer**: accept the tradeoff for Plan 1, gate access at the
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REST/MCP layer (where `space_id` IS available from the actor's session), and
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revisit when multi-tenant becomes load-bearing.
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Owner-only authn (Plan 1) means there's only one tenant in practice today, so (b) is
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defensible for the alpha. (a) is the right long-term answer.
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