- Q3: prod void DB role NOSUPERUSER (vector marked trusted; deploy/README documents it)
- Q4: buildChildEnv allow-list for the claude subprocess (no OWNER_TOKEN/DATABASE_URL/secrets leak)
- Q5: pending-change approve claims-before-applying + reopens on failure (no re-approvable dup)
- Q6: /capture/upload validates space_id (UUID+existence); pg pool statement_timeout 30s
- Q9: disabled failing syncoid-donatello timer on Z
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Owner-only routes wired with an applyPendingChange dispatch helper
covering page/project/task/ref/resource/source_doc create/update/delete.
Approve and reject emit their own audit_log entries (actions already in
the CHECK vocab) so the audit trail is self-contained.
Documents a latent bug in security-followups.md: pending_changes.action
CHECK constraint blocks 'upsert' / 'add_dependency' / 'remove_dependency'
divertToPending paths in refs/resources routes when an agent at suggest
tier hits them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
