Page view: header + split-pane markdown editor (textarea on left, marked + DOMPurify rendered preview on right) + backlinks card pulling /api/pages/:id/backlinks. Save calls PATCH /api/pages/:id with body_md and surfaces the resulting updated_at as a timestamp. Reference detail: media block (image preview / YouTube embed via youtube-nocookie / link fallback), summary card, metadata table, tags card with attach/detach (creates the tag idempotently then attaches), linked-from card from /api/links/to/ref/:id. marked + DOMPurify vendored to public/vendor as ESM. The markdown editor uses the explicit html: opt-in on dom.js's preview element only — all other text comes from textContent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1748 lines
82 KiB
JavaScript
1748 lines
82 KiB
JavaScript
/*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.7 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.7/LICENSE */
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function _arrayLikeToArray(r, a) {
|
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(null == a || a > r.length) && (a = r.length);
|
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for (var e = 0, n = Array(a); e < a; e++) n[e] = r[e];
|
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return n;
|
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}
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function _arrayWithHoles(r) {
|
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if (Array.isArray(r)) return r;
|
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}
|
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function _iterableToArrayLimit(r, l) {
|
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var t = null == r ? null : "undefined" != typeof Symbol && r[Symbol.iterator] || r["@@iterator"];
|
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if (null != t) {
|
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var e,
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n,
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i,
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u,
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a = [],
|
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f = true,
|
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o = false;
|
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try {
|
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if (i = (t = t.call(r)).next, 0 === l) ; else for (; !(f = (e = i.call(t)).done) && (a.push(e.value), a.length !== l); f = !0);
|
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} catch (r) {
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o = true, n = r;
|
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} finally {
|
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try {
|
|
if (!f && null != t.return && (u = t.return(), Object(u) !== u)) return;
|
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} finally {
|
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if (o) throw n;
|
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}
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}
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return a;
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}
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}
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function _nonIterableRest() {
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throw new TypeError("Invalid attempt to destructure non-iterable instance.\nIn order to be iterable, non-array objects must have a [Symbol.iterator]() method.");
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}
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function _slicedToArray(r, e) {
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return _arrayWithHoles(r) || _iterableToArrayLimit(r, e) || _unsupportedIterableToArray(r, e) || _nonIterableRest();
|
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}
|
|
function _unsupportedIterableToArray(r, a) {
|
|
if (r) {
|
|
if ("string" == typeof r) return _arrayLikeToArray(r, a);
|
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var t = {}.toString.call(r).slice(8, -1);
|
|
return "Object" === t && r.constructor && (t = r.constructor.name), "Map" === t || "Set" === t ? Array.from(r) : "Arguments" === t || /^(?:Ui|I)nt(?:8|16|32)(?:Clamped)?Array$/.test(t) ? _arrayLikeToArray(r, a) : void 0;
|
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}
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}
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|
|
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const entries = Object.entries,
|
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setPrototypeOf = Object.setPrototypeOf,
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isFrozen = Object.isFrozen,
|
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getPrototypeOf = Object.getPrototypeOf,
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getOwnPropertyDescriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;
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let freeze = Object.freeze,
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seal = Object.seal,
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create = Object.create; // eslint-disable-line import/no-mutable-exports
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let _ref = typeof Reflect !== 'undefined' && Reflect,
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apply = _ref.apply,
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construct = _ref.construct;
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if (!freeze) {
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freeze = function freeze(x) {
|
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return x;
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};
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}
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if (!seal) {
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seal = function seal(x) {
|
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return x;
|
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};
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}
|
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if (!apply) {
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apply = function apply(func, thisArg) {
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for (var _len = arguments.length, args = new Array(_len > 2 ? _len - 2 : 0), _key = 2; _key < _len; _key++) {
|
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args[_key - 2] = arguments[_key];
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}
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return func.apply(thisArg, args);
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};
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}
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if (!construct) {
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construct = function construct(Func) {
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for (var _len2 = arguments.length, args = new Array(_len2 > 1 ? _len2 - 1 : 0), _key2 = 1; _key2 < _len2; _key2++) {
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args[_key2 - 1] = arguments[_key2];
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}
|
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return new Func(...args);
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};
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}
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const arrayForEach = unapply(Array.prototype.forEach);
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const arrayLastIndexOf = unapply(Array.prototype.lastIndexOf);
|
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const arrayPop = unapply(Array.prototype.pop);
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const arrayPush = unapply(Array.prototype.push);
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const arraySplice = unapply(Array.prototype.splice);
|
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const arrayIsArray = Array.isArray;
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const stringToLowerCase = unapply(String.prototype.toLowerCase);
|
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const stringToString = unapply(String.prototype.toString);
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const stringMatch = unapply(String.prototype.match);
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const stringReplace = unapply(String.prototype.replace);
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const stringIndexOf = unapply(String.prototype.indexOf);
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const stringTrim = unapply(String.prototype.trim);
|
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const numberToString = unapply(Number.prototype.toString);
|
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const booleanToString = unapply(Boolean.prototype.toString);
|
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const bigintToString = typeof BigInt === 'undefined' ? null : unapply(BigInt.prototype.toString);
|
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const symbolToString = typeof Symbol === 'undefined' ? null : unapply(Symbol.prototype.toString);
|
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const objectHasOwnProperty = unapply(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty);
|
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const objectToString = unapply(Object.prototype.toString);
|
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const regExpTest = unapply(RegExp.prototype.test);
|
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const typeErrorCreate = unconstruct(TypeError);
|
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/**
|
|
* Creates a new function that calls the given function with a specified thisArg and arguments.
|
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*
|
|
* @param func - The function to be wrapped and called.
|
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* @returns A new function that calls the given function with a specified thisArg and arguments.
|
|
*/
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function unapply(func) {
|
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return function (thisArg) {
|
|
if (thisArg instanceof RegExp) {
|
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thisArg.lastIndex = 0;
|
|
}
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|
for (var _len3 = arguments.length, args = new Array(_len3 > 1 ? _len3 - 1 : 0), _key3 = 1; _key3 < _len3; _key3++) {
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args[_key3 - 1] = arguments[_key3];
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}
|
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return apply(func, thisArg, args);
|
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};
|
|
}
|
|
/**
|
|
* Creates a new function that constructs an instance of the given constructor function with the provided arguments.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param func - The constructor function to be wrapped and called.
|
|
* @returns A new function that constructs an instance of the given constructor function with the provided arguments.
|
|
*/
|
|
function unconstruct(Func) {
|
|
return function () {
|
|
for (var _len4 = arguments.length, args = new Array(_len4), _key4 = 0; _key4 < _len4; _key4++) {
|
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args[_key4] = arguments[_key4];
|
|
}
|
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return construct(Func, args);
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
/**
|
|
* Add properties to a lookup table
|
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*
|
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* @param set - The set to which elements will be added.
|
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* @param array - The array containing elements to be added to the set.
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* @param transformCaseFunc - An optional function to transform the case of each element before adding to the set.
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* @returns The modified set with added elements.
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*/
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function addToSet(set, array) {
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let transformCaseFunc = arguments.length > 2 && arguments[2] !== undefined ? arguments[2] : stringToLowerCase;
|
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if (setPrototypeOf) {
|
|
// Make 'in' and truthy checks like Boolean(set.constructor)
|
|
// independent of any properties defined on Object.prototype.
|
|
// Prevent prototype setters from intercepting set as a this value.
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setPrototypeOf(set, null);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!arrayIsArray(array)) {
|
|
return set;
|
|
}
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let l = array.length;
|
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while (l--) {
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let element = array[l];
|
|
if (typeof element === 'string') {
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const lcElement = transformCaseFunc(element);
|
|
if (lcElement !== element) {
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// Config presets (e.g. tags.js, attrs.js) are immutable.
|
|
if (!isFrozen(array)) {
|
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array[l] = lcElement;
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}
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element = lcElement;
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}
|
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}
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set[element] = true;
|
|
}
|
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return set;
|
|
}
|
|
/**
|
|
* Clean up an array to harden against CSPP
|
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*
|
|
* @param array - The array to be cleaned.
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|
* @returns The cleaned version of the array
|
|
*/
|
|
function cleanArray(array) {
|
|
for (let index = 0; index < array.length; index++) {
|
|
const isPropertyExist = objectHasOwnProperty(array, index);
|
|
if (!isPropertyExist) {
|
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array[index] = null;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return array;
|
|
}
|
|
/**
|
|
* Shallow clone an object
|
|
*
|
|
* @param object - The object to be cloned.
|
|
* @returns A new object that copies the original.
|
|
*/
|
|
function clone(object) {
|
|
const newObject = create(null);
|
|
for (const _ref2 of entries(object)) {
|
|
var _ref3 = _slicedToArray(_ref2, 2);
|
|
const property = _ref3[0];
|
|
const value = _ref3[1];
|
|
const isPropertyExist = objectHasOwnProperty(object, property);
|
|
if (isPropertyExist) {
|
|
if (arrayIsArray(value)) {
|
|
newObject[property] = cleanArray(value);
|
|
} else if (value && typeof value === 'object' && value.constructor === Object) {
|
|
newObject[property] = clone(value);
|
|
} else {
|
|
newObject[property] = value;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return newObject;
|
|
}
|
|
/**
|
|
* Convert non-node values into strings without depending on direct property access.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param value - The value to stringify.
|
|
* @returns A string representation of the provided value.
|
|
*/
|
|
function stringifyValue(value) {
|
|
switch (typeof value) {
|
|
case 'string':
|
|
{
|
|
return value;
|
|
}
|
|
case 'number':
|
|
{
|
|
return numberToString(value);
|
|
}
|
|
case 'boolean':
|
|
{
|
|
return booleanToString(value);
|
|
}
|
|
case 'bigint':
|
|
{
|
|
return bigintToString ? bigintToString(value) : '0';
|
|
}
|
|
case 'symbol':
|
|
{
|
|
return symbolToString ? symbolToString(value) : 'Symbol()';
|
|
}
|
|
case 'undefined':
|
|
{
|
|
return objectToString(value);
|
|
}
|
|
case 'function':
|
|
case 'object':
|
|
{
|
|
if (value === null) {
|
|
return objectToString(value);
|
|
}
|
|
const valueAsRecord = value;
|
|
const valueToString = lookupGetter(valueAsRecord, 'toString');
|
|
if (typeof valueToString === 'function') {
|
|
const stringified = valueToString(valueAsRecord);
|
|
return typeof stringified === 'string' ? stringified : objectToString(stringified);
|
|
}
|
|
return objectToString(value);
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
{
|
|
return objectToString(value);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/**
|
|
* This method automatically checks if the prop is function or getter and behaves accordingly.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param object - The object to look up the getter function in its prototype chain.
|
|
* @param prop - The property name for which to find the getter function.
|
|
* @returns The getter function found in the prototype chain or a fallback function.
|
|
*/
|
|
function lookupGetter(object, prop) {
|
|
while (object !== null) {
|
|
const desc = getOwnPropertyDescriptor(object, prop);
|
|
if (desc) {
|
|
if (desc.get) {
|
|
return unapply(desc.get);
|
|
}
|
|
if (typeof desc.value === 'function') {
|
|
return unapply(desc.value);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
object = getPrototypeOf(object);
|
|
}
|
|
function fallbackValue() {
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
return fallbackValue;
|
|
}
|
|
function isRegex(value) {
|
|
try {
|
|
regExpTest(value, '');
|
|
return true;
|
|
} catch (_unused) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const html$1 = freeze(['a', 'abbr', 'acronym', 'address', 'area', 'article', 'aside', 'audio', 'b', 'bdi', 'bdo', 'big', 'blink', 'blockquote', 'body', 'br', 'button', 'canvas', 'caption', 'center', 'cite', 'code', 'col', 'colgroup', 'content', 'data', 'datalist', 'dd', 'decorator', 'del', 'details', 'dfn', 'dialog', 'dir', 'div', 'dl', 'dt', 'element', 'em', 'fieldset', 'figcaption', 'figure', 'font', 'footer', 'form', 'h1', 'h2', 'h3', 'h4', 'h5', 'h6', 'head', 'header', 'hgroup', 'hr', 'html', 'i', 'img', 'input', 'ins', 'kbd', 'label', 'legend', 'li', 'main', 'map', 'mark', 'marquee', 'menu', 'menuitem', 'meter', 'nav', 'nobr', 'ol', 'optgroup', 'option', 'output', 'p', 'picture', 'pre', 'progress', 'q', 'rp', 'rt', 'ruby', 's', 'samp', 'search', 'section', 'select', 'shadow', 'slot', 'small', 'source', 'spacer', 'span', 'strike', 'strong', 'style', 'sub', 'summary', 'sup', 'table', 'tbody', 'td', 'template', 'textarea', 'tfoot', 'th', 'thead', 'time', 'tr', 'track', 'tt', 'u', 'ul', 'var', 'video', 'wbr']);
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const svg$1 = freeze(['svg', 'a', 'altglyph', 'altglyphdef', 'altglyphitem', 'animatecolor', 'animatemotion', 'animatetransform', 'circle', 'clippath', 'defs', 'desc', 'ellipse', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'filter', 'font', 'g', 'glyph', 'glyphref', 'hkern', 'image', 'inputmode', 'line', 'lineargradient', 'marker', 'mask', 'metadata', 'mpath', 'part', 'path', 'pattern', 'polygon', 'polyline', 'radialgradient', 'rect', 'stop', 'style', 'switch', 'symbol', 'text', 'textpath', 'title', 'tref', 'tspan', 'view', 'vkern']);
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const svgFilters = freeze(['feBlend', 'feColorMatrix', 'feComponentTransfer', 'feComposite', 'feConvolveMatrix', 'feDiffuseLighting', 'feDisplacementMap', 'feDistantLight', 'feDropShadow', 'feFlood', 'feFuncA', 'feFuncB', 'feFuncG', 'feFuncR', 'feGaussianBlur', 'feImage', 'feMerge', 'feMergeNode', 'feMorphology', 'feOffset', 'fePointLight', 'feSpecularLighting', 'feSpotLight', 'feTile', 'feTurbulence']);
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|
// List of SVG elements that are disallowed by default.
|
|
// We still need to know them so that we can do namespace
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// checks properly in case one wants to add them to
|
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// allow-list.
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const svgDisallowed = freeze(['animate', 'color-profile', 'cursor', 'discard', 'font-face', 'font-face-format', 'font-face-name', 'font-face-src', 'font-face-uri', 'foreignobject', 'hatch', 'hatchpath', 'mesh', 'meshgradient', 'meshpatch', 'meshrow', 'missing-glyph', 'script', 'set', 'solidcolor', 'unknown', 'use']);
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const mathMl$1 = freeze(['math', 'menclose', 'merror', 'mfenced', 'mfrac', 'mglyph', 'mi', 'mlabeledtr', 'mmultiscripts', 'mn', 'mo', 'mover', 'mpadded', 'mphantom', 'mroot', 'mrow', 'ms', 'mspace', 'msqrt', 'mstyle', 'msub', 'msup', 'msubsup', 'mtable', 'mtd', 'mtext', 'mtr', 'munder', 'munderover', 'mprescripts']);
|
|
// Similarly to SVG, we want to know all MathML elements,
|
|
// even those that we disallow by default.
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const mathMlDisallowed = freeze(['maction', 'maligngroup', 'malignmark', 'mlongdiv', 'mscarries', 'mscarry', 'msgroup', 'mstack', 'msline', 'msrow', 'semantics', 'annotation', 'annotation-xml', 'mprescripts', 'none']);
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const text = freeze(['#text']);
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const html = freeze(['accept', 'action', 'align', 'alt', 'autocapitalize', 'autocomplete', 'autopictureinpicture', 'autoplay', 'background', 'bgcolor', 'border', 'capture', 'cellpadding', 'cellspacing', 'checked', 'cite', 'class', 'clear', 'color', 'cols', 'colspan', 'command', 'commandfor', 'controls', 'controlslist', 'coords', 'crossorigin', 'datetime', 'decoding', 'default', 'dir', 'disabled', 'disablepictureinpicture', 'disableremoteplayback', 'download', 'draggable', 'enctype', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'face', 'for', 'headers', 'height', 'hidden', 'high', 'href', 'hreflang', 'id', 'inert', 'inputmode', 'integrity', 'ismap', 'kind', 'label', 'lang', 'list', 'loading', 'loop', 'low', 'max', 'maxlength', 'media', 'method', 'min', 'minlength', 'multiple', 'muted', 'name', 'nonce', 'noshade', 'novalidate', 'nowrap', 'open', 'optimum', 'part', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'playsinline', 'popover', 'popovertarget', 'popovertargetaction', 'poster', 'preload', 'pubdate', 'radiogroup', 'readonly', 'rel', 'required', 'rev', 'reversed', 'role', 'rows', 'rowspan', 'spellcheck', 'scope', 'selected', 'shape', 'size', 'sizes', 'slot', 'span', 'srclang', 'start', 'src', 'srcset', 'step', 'style', 'summary', 'tabindex', 'title', 'translate', 'type', 'usemap', 'valign', 'value', 'width', 'wrap', 'xmlns']);
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const svg = freeze(['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alignment-baseline', 'amplitude', 'ascent', 'attributename', 'attributetype', 'azimuth', 'basefrequency', 'baseline-shift', 'begin', 'bias', 'by', 'class', 'clip', 'clippathunits', 'clip-path', 'clip-rule', 'color', 'color-interpolation', 'color-interpolation-filters', 'color-profile', 'color-rendering', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx', 'dy', 'diffuseconstant', 'direction', 'display', 'divisor', 'dur', 'edgemode', 'elevation', 'end', 'exponent', 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule', 'filter', 'filterunits', 'flood-color', 'flood-opacity', 'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-size-adjust', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name', 'glyphref', 'gradientunits', 'gradienttransform', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'image-rendering', 'in', 'in2', 'intercept', 'k', 'k1', 'k2', 'k3', 'k4', 'kerning', 'keypoints', 'keysplines', 'keytimes', 'lang', 'lengthadjust', 'letter-spacing', 'kernelmatrix', 'kernelunitlength', 'lighting-color', 'local', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerheight', 'markerunits', 'markerwidth', 'maskcontentunits', 'maskunits', 'max', 'mask', 'mask-type', 'media', 'method', 'mode', 'min', 'name', 'numoctaves', 'offset', 'operator', 'opacity', 'order', 'orient', 'orientation', 'origin', 'overflow', 'paint-order', 'path', 'pathlength', 'patterncontentunits', 'patterntransform', 'patternunits', 'points', 'preservealpha', 'preserveaspectratio', 'primitiveunits', 'r', 'rx', 'ry', 'radius', 'refx', 'refy', 'repeatcount', 'repeatdur', 'restart', 'result', 'rotate', 'scale', 'seed', 'shape-rendering', 'slope', 'specularconstant', 'specularexponent', 'spreadmethod', 'startoffset', 'stddeviation', 'stitchtiles', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity', 'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity', 'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'style', 'surfacescale', 'systemlanguage', 'tabindex', 'tablevalues', 'targetx', 'targety', 'transform', 'transform-origin', 'text-anchor', 'text-decoration', 'text-rendering', 'textlength', 'type', 'u1', 'u2', 'unicode', 'values', 'viewbox', 'visibility', 'version', 'vert-adv-y', 'vert-origin-x', 'vert-origin-y', 'width', 'word-spacing', 'wrap', 'writing-mode', 'xchannelselector', 'ychannelselector', 'x', 'x1', 'x2', 'xmlns', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'z', 'zoomandpan']);
|
|
const mathMl = freeze(['accent', 'accentunder', 'align', 'bevelled', 'close', 'columnalign', 'columnlines', 'columnspacing', 'columnspan', 'denomalign', 'depth', 'dir', 'display', 'displaystyle', 'encoding', 'fence', 'frame', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'largeop', 'length', 'linethickness', 'lquote', 'lspace', 'mathbackground', 'mathcolor', 'mathsize', 'mathvariant', 'maxsize', 'minsize', 'movablelimits', 'notation', 'numalign', 'open', 'rowalign', 'rowlines', 'rowspacing', 'rowspan', 'rspace', 'rquote', 'scriptlevel', 'scriptminsize', 'scriptsizemultiplier', 'selection', 'separator', 'separators', 'stretchy', 'subscriptshift', 'supscriptshift', 'symmetric', 'voffset', 'width', 'xmlns']);
|
|
const xml = freeze(['xlink:href', 'xml:id', 'xlink:title', 'xml:space', 'xmlns:xlink']);
|
|
|
|
const MUSTACHE_EXPR = seal(/{{[\w\W]*|^[\w\W]*}}/g);
|
|
const ERB_EXPR = seal(/<%[\w\W]*|^[\w\W]*%>/g);
|
|
const TMPLIT_EXPR = seal(/\${[\w\W]*/g);
|
|
const DATA_ATTR = seal(/^data-[\-\w.\u00B7-\uFFFF]+$/); // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
|
|
const ARIA_ATTR = seal(/^aria-[\-\w]+$/); // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
|
|
const IS_ALLOWED_URI = seal(/^(?:(?:(?:f|ht)tps?|mailto|tel|callto|sms|cid|xmpp|matrix):|[^a-z]|[a-z+.\-]+(?:[^a-z+.\-:]|$))/i // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
|
|
);
|
|
const IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA = seal(/^(?:\w+script|data):/i);
|
|
const ATTR_WHITESPACE = seal(/[\u0000-\u0020\u00A0\u1680\u180E\u2000-\u2029\u205F\u3000]/g // eslint-disable-line no-control-regex
|
|
);
|
|
const DOCTYPE_NAME = seal(/^html$/i);
|
|
const CUSTOM_ELEMENT = seal(/^[a-z][.\w]*(-[.\w]+)+$/i);
|
|
|
|
/* eslint-disable @typescript-eslint/indent */
|
|
// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Node/nodeType
|
|
const NODE_TYPE = {
|
|
element: 1,
|
|
attribute: 2,
|
|
text: 3,
|
|
cdataSection: 4,
|
|
entityReference: 5,
|
|
// Deprecated
|
|
entityNode: 6,
|
|
// Deprecated
|
|
progressingInstruction: 7,
|
|
comment: 8,
|
|
document: 9,
|
|
documentType: 10,
|
|
documentFragment: 11,
|
|
notation: 12 // Deprecated
|
|
};
|
|
const getGlobal = function getGlobal() {
|
|
return typeof window === 'undefined' ? null : window;
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* Creates a no-op policy for internal use only.
|
|
* Don't export this function outside this module!
|
|
* @param trustedTypes The policy factory.
|
|
* @param purifyHostElement The Script element used to load DOMPurify (to determine policy name suffix).
|
|
* @return The policy created (or null, if Trusted Types
|
|
* are not supported or creating the policy failed).
|
|
*/
|
|
const _createTrustedTypesPolicy = function _createTrustedTypesPolicy(trustedTypes, purifyHostElement) {
|
|
if (typeof trustedTypes !== 'object' || typeof trustedTypes.createPolicy !== 'function') {
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
// Allow the callers to control the unique policy name
|
|
// by adding a data-tt-policy-suffix to the script element with the DOMPurify.
|
|
// Policy creation with duplicate names throws in Trusted Types.
|
|
let suffix = null;
|
|
const ATTR_NAME = 'data-tt-policy-suffix';
|
|
if (purifyHostElement && purifyHostElement.hasAttribute(ATTR_NAME)) {
|
|
suffix = purifyHostElement.getAttribute(ATTR_NAME);
|
|
}
|
|
const policyName = 'dompurify' + (suffix ? '#' + suffix : '');
|
|
try {
|
|
return trustedTypes.createPolicy(policyName, {
|
|
createHTML(html) {
|
|
return html;
|
|
},
|
|
createScriptURL(scriptUrl) {
|
|
return scriptUrl;
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
// Policy creation failed (most likely another DOMPurify script has
|
|
// already run). Skip creating the policy, as this will only cause errors
|
|
// if TT are enforced.
|
|
console.warn('TrustedTypes policy ' + policyName + ' could not be created.');
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
const _createHooksMap = function _createHooksMap() {
|
|
return {
|
|
afterSanitizeAttributes: [],
|
|
afterSanitizeElements: [],
|
|
afterSanitizeShadowDOM: [],
|
|
beforeSanitizeAttributes: [],
|
|
beforeSanitizeElements: [],
|
|
beforeSanitizeShadowDOM: [],
|
|
uponSanitizeAttribute: [],
|
|
uponSanitizeElement: [],
|
|
uponSanitizeShadowNode: []
|
|
};
|
|
};
|
|
function createDOMPurify() {
|
|
let window = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : getGlobal();
|
|
const DOMPurify = root => createDOMPurify(root);
|
|
DOMPurify.version = '3.4.7';
|
|
DOMPurify.removed = [];
|
|
if (!window || !window.document || window.document.nodeType !== NODE_TYPE.document || !window.Element) {
|
|
// Not running in a browser, provide a factory function
|
|
// so that you can pass your own Window
|
|
DOMPurify.isSupported = false;
|
|
return DOMPurify;
|
|
}
|
|
let document = window.document;
|
|
const originalDocument = document;
|
|
const currentScript = originalDocument.currentScript;
|
|
window.DocumentFragment;
|
|
const HTMLTemplateElement = window.HTMLTemplateElement,
|
|
Node = window.Node,
|
|
Element = window.Element,
|
|
NodeFilter = window.NodeFilter,
|
|
_window$NamedNodeMap = window.NamedNodeMap;
|
|
_window$NamedNodeMap === void 0 ? window.NamedNodeMap || window.MozNamedAttrMap : _window$NamedNodeMap;
|
|
window.HTMLFormElement;
|
|
const DOMParser = window.DOMParser,
|
|
trustedTypes = window.trustedTypes;
|
|
const ElementPrototype = Element.prototype;
|
|
const cloneNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'cloneNode');
|
|
const remove = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'remove');
|
|
const getNextSibling = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'nextSibling');
|
|
const getChildNodes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'childNodes');
|
|
const getParentNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'parentNode');
|
|
const getShadowRoot = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'shadowRoot');
|
|
const getAttributes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'attributes');
|
|
const getNodeType = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeType') : null;
|
|
const getNodeName = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeName') : null;
|
|
// As per issue #47, the web-components registry is inherited by a
|
|
// new document created via createHTMLDocument. As per the spec
|
|
// (http://w3c.github.io/webcomponents/spec/custom/#creating-and-passing-registries)
|
|
// a new empty registry is used when creating a template contents owner
|
|
// document, so we use that as our parent document to ensure nothing
|
|
// is inherited.
|
|
if (typeof HTMLTemplateElement === 'function') {
|
|
const template = document.createElement('template');
|
|
if (template.content && template.content.ownerDocument) {
|
|
document = template.content.ownerDocument;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
let trustedTypesPolicy;
|
|
let emptyHTML = '';
|
|
const _document = document,
|
|
implementation = _document.implementation,
|
|
createNodeIterator = _document.createNodeIterator,
|
|
createDocumentFragment = _document.createDocumentFragment,
|
|
getElementsByTagName = _document.getElementsByTagName;
|
|
const importNode = originalDocument.importNode;
|
|
let hooks = _createHooksMap();
|
|
/**
|
|
* Expose whether this browser supports running the full DOMPurify.
|
|
*/
|
|
DOMPurify.isSupported = typeof entries === 'function' && typeof getParentNode === 'function' && implementation && implementation.createHTMLDocument !== undefined;
|
|
const MUSTACHE_EXPR$1 = MUSTACHE_EXPR,
|
|
ERB_EXPR$1 = ERB_EXPR,
|
|
TMPLIT_EXPR$1 = TMPLIT_EXPR,
|
|
DATA_ATTR$1 = DATA_ATTR,
|
|
ARIA_ATTR$1 = ARIA_ATTR,
|
|
IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA$1 = IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA,
|
|
ATTR_WHITESPACE$1 = ATTR_WHITESPACE,
|
|
CUSTOM_ELEMENT$1 = CUSTOM_ELEMENT;
|
|
let IS_ALLOWED_URI$1 = IS_ALLOWED_URI;
|
|
/**
|
|
* We consider the elements and attributes below to be safe. Ideally
|
|
* don't add any new ones but feel free to remove unwanted ones.
|
|
*/
|
|
/* allowed element names */
|
|
let ALLOWED_TAGS = null;
|
|
const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS = addToSet({}, [...html$1, ...svg$1, ...svgFilters, ...mathMl$1, ...text]);
|
|
/* Allowed attribute names */
|
|
let ALLOWED_ATTR = null;
|
|
const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR = addToSet({}, [...html, ...svg, ...mathMl, ...xml]);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Configure how DOMPurify should handle custom elements and their attributes as well as customized built-in elements.
|
|
* @property {RegExp|Function|null} tagNameCheck one of [null, regexPattern, predicate]. Default: `null` (disallow any custom elements)
|
|
* @property {RegExp|Function|null} attributeNameCheck one of [null, regexPattern, predicate]. Default: `null` (disallow any attributes not on the allow list)
|
|
* @property {boolean} allowCustomizedBuiltInElements allow custom elements derived from built-ins if they pass CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck. Default: `false`.
|
|
*/
|
|
let CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = Object.seal(create(null, {
|
|
tagNameCheck: {
|
|
writable: true,
|
|
configurable: false,
|
|
enumerable: true,
|
|
value: null
|
|
},
|
|
attributeNameCheck: {
|
|
writable: true,
|
|
configurable: false,
|
|
enumerable: true,
|
|
value: null
|
|
},
|
|
allowCustomizedBuiltInElements: {
|
|
writable: true,
|
|
configurable: false,
|
|
enumerable: true,
|
|
value: false
|
|
}
|
|
}));
|
|
/* Explicitly forbidden tags (overrides ALLOWED_TAGS/ADD_TAGS) */
|
|
let FORBID_TAGS = null;
|
|
/* Explicitly forbidden attributes (overrides ALLOWED_ATTR/ADD_ATTR) */
|
|
let FORBID_ATTR = null;
|
|
/* Config object to store ADD_TAGS/ADD_ATTR functions (when used as functions) */
|
|
const EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING = Object.seal(create(null, {
|
|
tagCheck: {
|
|
writable: true,
|
|
configurable: false,
|
|
enumerable: true,
|
|
value: null
|
|
},
|
|
attributeCheck: {
|
|
writable: true,
|
|
configurable: false,
|
|
enumerable: true,
|
|
value: null
|
|
}
|
|
}));
|
|
/* Decide if ARIA attributes are okay */
|
|
let ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR = true;
|
|
/* Decide if custom data attributes are okay */
|
|
let ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = true;
|
|
/* Decide if unknown protocols are okay */
|
|
let ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS = false;
|
|
/* Decide if self-closing tags in attributes are allowed.
|
|
* Usually removed due to a mXSS issue in jQuery 3.0 */
|
|
let ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR = true;
|
|
/* Output should be safe for common template engines.
|
|
* This means, DOMPurify removes data attributes, mustaches and ERB
|
|
*/
|
|
let SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES = false;
|
|
/* Output should be safe even for XML used within HTML and alike.
|
|
* This means, DOMPurify removes comments when containing risky content.
|
|
*/
|
|
let SAFE_FOR_XML = true;
|
|
/* Decide if document with <html>... should be returned */
|
|
let WHOLE_DOCUMENT = false;
|
|
/* Track whether config is already set on this instance of DOMPurify. */
|
|
let SET_CONFIG = false;
|
|
/* Decide if all elements (e.g. style, script) must be children of
|
|
* document.body. By default, browsers might move them to document.head */
|
|
let FORCE_BODY = false;
|
|
/* Decide if a DOM `HTMLBodyElement` should be returned, instead of a html
|
|
* string (or a TrustedHTML object if Trusted Types are supported).
|
|
* If `WHOLE_DOCUMENT` is enabled a `HTMLHtmlElement` will be returned instead
|
|
*/
|
|
let RETURN_DOM = false;
|
|
/* Decide if a DOM `DocumentFragment` should be returned, instead of a html
|
|
* string (or a TrustedHTML object if Trusted Types are supported) */
|
|
let RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT = false;
|
|
/* Try to return a Trusted Type object instead of a string, return a string in
|
|
* case Trusted Types are not supported */
|
|
let RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE = false;
|
|
/* Output should be free from DOM clobbering attacks?
|
|
* This sanitizes markups named with colliding, clobberable built-in DOM APIs.
|
|
*/
|
|
let SANITIZE_DOM = true;
|
|
/* Achieve full DOM Clobbering protection by isolating the namespace of named
|
|
* properties and JS variables, mitigating attacks that abuse the HTML/DOM spec rules.
|
|
*
|
|
* HTML/DOM spec rules that enable DOM Clobbering:
|
|
* - Named Access on Window (§7.3.3)
|
|
* - DOM Tree Accessors (§3.1.5)
|
|
* - Form Element Parent-Child Relations (§4.10.3)
|
|
* - Iframe srcdoc / Nested WindowProxies (§4.8.5)
|
|
* - HTMLCollection (§4.2.10.2)
|
|
*
|
|
* Namespace isolation is implemented by prefixing `id` and `name` attributes
|
|
* with a constant string, i.e., `user-content-`
|
|
*/
|
|
let SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS = false;
|
|
const SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX = 'user-content-';
|
|
/* Keep element content when removing element? */
|
|
let KEEP_CONTENT = true;
|
|
/* If a `Node` is passed to sanitize(), then performs sanitization in-place instead
|
|
* of importing it into a new Document and returning a sanitized copy */
|
|
let IN_PLACE = false;
|
|
/* Allow usage of profiles like html, svg and mathMl */
|
|
let USE_PROFILES = {};
|
|
/* Tags to ignore content of when KEEP_CONTENT is true */
|
|
let FORBID_CONTENTS = null;
|
|
const DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml', 'audio', 'colgroup', 'desc', 'foreignobject', 'head', 'iframe', 'math', 'mi', 'mn', 'mo', 'ms', 'mtext', 'noembed', 'noframes', 'noscript', 'plaintext', 'script', 'style', 'svg', 'template', 'thead', 'title', 'video', 'xmp']);
|
|
/* Tags that are safe for data: URIs */
|
|
let DATA_URI_TAGS = null;
|
|
const DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS = addToSet({}, ['audio', 'video', 'img', 'source', 'image', 'track']);
|
|
/* Attributes safe for values like "javascript:" */
|
|
let URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = null;
|
|
const DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = addToSet({}, ['alt', 'class', 'for', 'id', 'label', 'name', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'role', 'summary', 'title', 'value', 'style', 'xmlns']);
|
|
const MATHML_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML';
|
|
const SVG_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/2000/svg';
|
|
const HTML_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml';
|
|
/* Document namespace */
|
|
let NAMESPACE = HTML_NAMESPACE;
|
|
let IS_EMPTY_INPUT = false;
|
|
/* Allowed XHTML+XML namespaces */
|
|
let ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = null;
|
|
const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = addToSet({}, [MATHML_NAMESPACE, SVG_NAMESPACE, HTML_NAMESPACE], stringToString);
|
|
let MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, ['mi', 'mo', 'mn', 'ms', 'mtext']);
|
|
let HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml']);
|
|
// Certain elements are allowed in both SVG and HTML
|
|
// namespace. We need to specify them explicitly
|
|
// so that they don't get erroneously deleted from
|
|
// HTML namespace.
|
|
const COMMON_SVG_AND_HTML_ELEMENTS = addToSet({}, ['title', 'style', 'font', 'a', 'script']);
|
|
/* Parsing of strict XHTML documents */
|
|
let PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE = null;
|
|
const SUPPORTED_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPES = ['application/xhtml+xml', 'text/html'];
|
|
const DEFAULT_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE = 'text/html';
|
|
let transformCaseFunc = null;
|
|
/* Keep a reference to config to pass to hooks */
|
|
let CONFIG = null;
|
|
/* Ideally, do not touch anything below this line */
|
|
/* ______________________________________________ */
|
|
const formElement = document.createElement('form');
|
|
const isRegexOrFunction = function isRegexOrFunction(testValue) {
|
|
return testValue instanceof RegExp || testValue instanceof Function;
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _parseConfig
|
|
*
|
|
* @param cfg optional config literal
|
|
*/
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line complexity
|
|
const _parseConfig = function _parseConfig() {
|
|
let cfg = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : {};
|
|
if (CONFIG && CONFIG === cfg) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Shield configuration object from tampering */
|
|
if (!cfg || typeof cfg !== 'object') {
|
|
cfg = {};
|
|
}
|
|
/* Shield configuration object from prototype pollution */
|
|
cfg = clone(cfg);
|
|
PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE =
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-includes
|
|
SUPPORTED_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPES.indexOf(cfg.PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE) === -1 ? DEFAULT_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE : cfg.PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE;
|
|
// HTML tags and attributes are not case-sensitive, converting to lowercase. Keeping XHTML as is.
|
|
transformCaseFunc = PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' ? stringToString : stringToLowerCase;
|
|
/* Set configuration parameters */
|
|
ALLOWED_TAGS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_TAGS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ALLOWED_TAGS) ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_TAGS, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS;
|
|
ALLOWED_ATTR = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_ATTR') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ALLOWED_ATTR) ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_ATTR, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR;
|
|
ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_NAMESPACES') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ALLOWED_NAMESPACES) ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_NAMESPACES, stringToString) : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES;
|
|
URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR) ? addToSet(clone(DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES), cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES;
|
|
DATA_URI_TAGS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS) ? addToSet(clone(DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS), cfg.ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS;
|
|
FORBID_CONTENTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS) ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS;
|
|
FORBID_TAGS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_TAGS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.FORBID_TAGS) ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_TAGS, transformCaseFunc) : clone({});
|
|
FORBID_ATTR = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_ATTR') && arrayIsArray(cfg.FORBID_ATTR) ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_ATTR, transformCaseFunc) : clone({});
|
|
USE_PROFILES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'USE_PROFILES') ? cfg.USE_PROFILES && typeof cfg.USE_PROFILES === 'object' ? clone(cfg.USE_PROFILES) : cfg.USE_PROFILES : false;
|
|
ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
|
|
ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_DATA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
|
|
ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS = cfg.ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS || false; // Default false
|
|
ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR !== false; // Default true
|
|
SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES = cfg.SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES || false; // Default false
|
|
SAFE_FOR_XML = cfg.SAFE_FOR_XML !== false; // Default true
|
|
WHOLE_DOCUMENT = cfg.WHOLE_DOCUMENT || false; // Default false
|
|
RETURN_DOM = cfg.RETURN_DOM || false; // Default false
|
|
RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT = cfg.RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT || false; // Default false
|
|
RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE = cfg.RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE || false; // Default false
|
|
FORCE_BODY = cfg.FORCE_BODY || false; // Default false
|
|
SANITIZE_DOM = cfg.SANITIZE_DOM !== false; // Default true
|
|
SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS = cfg.SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS || false; // Default false
|
|
KEEP_CONTENT = cfg.KEEP_CONTENT !== false; // Default true
|
|
IN_PLACE = cfg.IN_PLACE || false; // Default false
|
|
IS_ALLOWED_URI$1 = isRegex(cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP) ? cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP : IS_ALLOWED_URI; // Default regexp
|
|
NAMESPACE = typeof cfg.NAMESPACE === 'string' ? cfg.NAMESPACE : HTML_NAMESPACE; // Default HTML namespace
|
|
MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS') && cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS && typeof cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS === 'object' ? clone(cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS) : addToSet({}, ['mi', 'mo', 'mn', 'ms', 'mtext']); // Default built-in map
|
|
HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS') && cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS && typeof cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS === 'object' ? clone(cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS) : addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml']); // Default built-in map
|
|
const customElementHandling = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING') && cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING && typeof cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING === 'object' ? clone(cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING) : create(null);
|
|
CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = create(null);
|
|
if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'tagNameCheck') && isRegexOrFunction(customElementHandling.tagNameCheck)) {
|
|
CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck = customElementHandling.tagNameCheck; // Default undefined
|
|
}
|
|
if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'attributeNameCheck') && isRegexOrFunction(customElementHandling.attributeNameCheck)) {
|
|
CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck = customElementHandling.attributeNameCheck; // Default undefined
|
|
}
|
|
if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'allowCustomizedBuiltInElements') && typeof customElementHandling.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements === 'boolean') {
|
|
CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements = customElementHandling.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements; // Default undefined
|
|
}
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
|
|
ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
|
|
RETURN_DOM = true;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Parse profile info */
|
|
if (USE_PROFILES) {
|
|
ALLOWED_TAGS = addToSet({}, text);
|
|
ALLOWED_ATTR = create(null);
|
|
if (USE_PROFILES.html === true) {
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, html$1);
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, html);
|
|
}
|
|
if (USE_PROFILES.svg === true) {
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, svg$1);
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, svg);
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, xml);
|
|
}
|
|
if (USE_PROFILES.svgFilters === true) {
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, svgFilters);
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, svg);
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, xml);
|
|
}
|
|
if (USE_PROFILES.mathMl === true) {
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, mathMl$1);
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, mathMl);
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, xml);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Always reset function-based ADD_TAGS / ADD_ATTR checks to prevent
|
|
* leaking across calls when switching from function to array config */
|
|
EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck = null;
|
|
EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck = null;
|
|
/* Merge configuration parameters */
|
|
if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_TAGS')) {
|
|
if (typeof cfg.ADD_TAGS === 'function') {
|
|
EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck = cfg.ADD_TAGS;
|
|
} else if (arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_TAGS)) {
|
|
if (ALLOWED_TAGS === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS) {
|
|
ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);
|
|
}
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, cfg.ADD_TAGS, transformCaseFunc);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_ATTR')) {
|
|
if (typeof cfg.ADD_ATTR === 'function') {
|
|
EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck = cfg.ADD_ATTR;
|
|
} else if (arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_ATTR)) {
|
|
if (ALLOWED_ATTR === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR) {
|
|
ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);
|
|
}
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, cfg.ADD_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR)) {
|
|
addToSet(URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES, cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);
|
|
}
|
|
if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS)) {
|
|
if (FORBID_CONTENTS === DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
|
|
FORBID_CONTENTS = clone(FORBID_CONTENTS);
|
|
}
|
|
addToSet(FORBID_CONTENTS, cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc);
|
|
}
|
|
if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS)) {
|
|
if (FORBID_CONTENTS === DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
|
|
FORBID_CONTENTS = clone(FORBID_CONTENTS);
|
|
}
|
|
addToSet(FORBID_CONTENTS, cfg.ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Add #text in case KEEP_CONTENT is set to true */
|
|
if (KEEP_CONTENT) {
|
|
ALLOWED_TAGS['#text'] = true;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Add html, head and body to ALLOWED_TAGS in case WHOLE_DOCUMENT is true */
|
|
if (WHOLE_DOCUMENT) {
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, ['html', 'head', 'body']);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Add tbody to ALLOWED_TAGS in case tables are permitted, see #286, #365 */
|
|
if (ALLOWED_TAGS.table) {
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, ['tbody']);
|
|
delete FORBID_TAGS.tbody;
|
|
}
|
|
if (cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY) {
|
|
if (typeof cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createHTML !== 'function') {
|
|
throw typeErrorCreate('TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createHTML" hook.');
|
|
}
|
|
if (typeof cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createScriptURL !== 'function') {
|
|
throw typeErrorCreate('TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createScriptURL" hook.');
|
|
}
|
|
// Overwrite existing TrustedTypes policy.
|
|
trustedTypesPolicy = cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY;
|
|
// Sign local variables required by `sanitize`.
|
|
emptyHTML = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML('');
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Uninitialized policy, attempt to initialize the internal dompurify policy.
|
|
if (trustedTypesPolicy === undefined) {
|
|
trustedTypesPolicy = _createTrustedTypesPolicy(trustedTypes, currentScript);
|
|
}
|
|
// If creating the internal policy succeeded sign internal variables.
|
|
if (trustedTypesPolicy !== null && typeof emptyHTML === 'string') {
|
|
emptyHTML = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML('');
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Mirror the clone-before-mutate pattern already applied above for
|
|
* cfg.ADD_TAGS / cfg.ADD_ATTR: if any uponSanitize* hook is
|
|
* registered AND the set still points at the default constant,
|
|
* clone it. The hook then mutates the clone (in-call widening
|
|
* still works exactly as documented) and the next default-cfg
|
|
* call rebinds to the untouched original via the reassignment at
|
|
* the top of this function.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((hooks.uponSanitizeElement.length > 0 || hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute.length > 0) && ALLOWED_TAGS === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS) {
|
|
ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);
|
|
}
|
|
if (hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute.length > 0 && ALLOWED_ATTR === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR) {
|
|
ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);
|
|
}
|
|
// Prevent further manipulation of configuration.
|
|
// Not available in IE8, Safari 5, etc.
|
|
if (freeze) {
|
|
freeze(cfg);
|
|
}
|
|
CONFIG = cfg;
|
|
};
|
|
/* Keep track of all possible SVG and MathML tags
|
|
* so that we can perform the namespace checks
|
|
* correctly. */
|
|
const ALL_SVG_TAGS = addToSet({}, [...svg$1, ...svgFilters, ...svgDisallowed]);
|
|
const ALL_MATHML_TAGS = addToSet({}, [...mathMl$1, ...mathMlDisallowed]);
|
|
/**
|
|
* @param element a DOM element whose namespace is being checked
|
|
* @returns Return false if the element has a
|
|
* namespace that a spec-compliant parser would never
|
|
* return. Return true otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
const _checkValidNamespace = function _checkValidNamespace(element) {
|
|
let parent = getParentNode(element);
|
|
// In JSDOM, if we're inside shadow DOM, then parentNode
|
|
// can be null. We just simulate parent in this case.
|
|
if (!parent || !parent.tagName) {
|
|
parent = {
|
|
namespaceURI: NAMESPACE,
|
|
tagName: 'template'
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
const tagName = stringToLowerCase(element.tagName);
|
|
const parentTagName = stringToLowerCase(parent.tagName);
|
|
if (!ALLOWED_NAMESPACES[element.namespaceURI]) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (element.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
// The only way to switch from HTML namespace to SVG
|
|
// is via <svg>. If it happens via any other tag, then
|
|
// it should be killed.
|
|
if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
return tagName === 'svg';
|
|
}
|
|
// The only way to switch from MathML to SVG is via`
|
|
// svg if parent is either <annotation-xml> or MathML
|
|
// text integration points.
|
|
if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
return tagName === 'svg' && (parentTagName === 'annotation-xml' || MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]);
|
|
}
|
|
// We only allow elements that are defined in SVG
|
|
// spec. All others are disallowed in SVG namespace.
|
|
return Boolean(ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
|
|
}
|
|
if (element.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
// The only way to switch from HTML namespace to MathML
|
|
// is via <math>. If it happens via any other tag, then
|
|
// it should be killed.
|
|
if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
return tagName === 'math';
|
|
}
|
|
// The only way to switch from SVG to MathML is via
|
|
// <math> and HTML integration points
|
|
if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
return tagName === 'math' && HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName];
|
|
}
|
|
// We only allow elements that are defined in MathML
|
|
// spec. All others are disallowed in MathML namespace.
|
|
return Boolean(ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName]);
|
|
}
|
|
if (element.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
// The only way to switch from SVG to HTML is via
|
|
// HTML integration points, and from MathML to HTML
|
|
// is via MathML text integration points
|
|
if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE && !HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE && !MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
// We disallow tags that are specific for MathML
|
|
// or SVG and should never appear in HTML namespace
|
|
return !ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName] && (COMMON_SVG_AND_HTML_ELEMENTS[tagName] || !ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
|
|
}
|
|
// For XHTML and XML documents that support custom namespaces
|
|
if (PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' && ALLOWED_NAMESPACES[element.namespaceURI]) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
// The code should never reach this place (this means
|
|
// that the element somehow got namespace that is not
|
|
// HTML, SVG, MathML or allowed via ALLOWED_NAMESPACES).
|
|
// Return false just in case.
|
|
return false;
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _forceRemove
|
|
*
|
|
* @param node a DOM node
|
|
*/
|
|
const _forceRemove = function _forceRemove(node) {
|
|
arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
|
|
element: node
|
|
});
|
|
try {
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-remove
|
|
getParentNode(node).removeChild(node);
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
remove(node);
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _removeAttribute
|
|
*
|
|
* @param name an Attribute name
|
|
* @param element a DOM node
|
|
*/
|
|
const _removeAttribute = function _removeAttribute(name, element) {
|
|
try {
|
|
arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
|
|
attribute: element.getAttributeNode(name),
|
|
from: element
|
|
});
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
|
|
attribute: null,
|
|
from: element
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
element.removeAttribute(name);
|
|
// We void attribute values for unremovable "is" attributes
|
|
if (name === 'is') {
|
|
if (RETURN_DOM || RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
|
|
try {
|
|
_forceRemove(element);
|
|
} catch (_) {}
|
|
} else {
|
|
try {
|
|
element.setAttribute(name, '');
|
|
} catch (_) {}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _initDocument
|
|
*
|
|
* @param dirty - a string of dirty markup
|
|
* @return a DOM, filled with the dirty markup
|
|
*/
|
|
const _initDocument = function _initDocument(dirty) {
|
|
/* Create a HTML document */
|
|
let doc = null;
|
|
let leadingWhitespace = null;
|
|
if (FORCE_BODY) {
|
|
dirty = '<remove></remove>' + dirty;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* If FORCE_BODY isn't used, leading whitespace needs to be preserved manually */
|
|
const matches = stringMatch(dirty, /^[\r\n\t ]+/);
|
|
leadingWhitespace = matches && matches[0];
|
|
}
|
|
if (PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' && NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
// Root of XHTML doc must contain xmlns declaration (see https://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/normative.html#strict)
|
|
dirty = '<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head></head><body>' + dirty + '</body></html>';
|
|
}
|
|
const dirtyPayload = trustedTypesPolicy ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(dirty) : dirty;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Use the DOMParser API by default, fallback later if needs be
|
|
* DOMParser not work for svg when has multiple root element.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
try {
|
|
doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(dirtyPayload, PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE);
|
|
} catch (_) {}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Use createHTMLDocument in case DOMParser is not available */
|
|
if (!doc || !doc.documentElement) {
|
|
doc = implementation.createDocument(NAMESPACE, 'template', null);
|
|
try {
|
|
doc.documentElement.innerHTML = IS_EMPTY_INPUT ? emptyHTML : dirtyPayload;
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
// Syntax error if dirtyPayload is invalid xml
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const body = doc.body || doc.documentElement;
|
|
if (dirty && leadingWhitespace) {
|
|
body.insertBefore(document.createTextNode(leadingWhitespace), body.childNodes[0] || null);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Work on whole document or just its body */
|
|
if (NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
return getElementsByTagName.call(doc, WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? 'html' : 'body')[0];
|
|
}
|
|
return WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? doc.documentElement : body;
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* Creates a NodeIterator object that you can use to traverse filtered lists of nodes or elements in a document.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param root The root element or node to start traversing on.
|
|
* @return The created NodeIterator
|
|
*/
|
|
const _createNodeIterator = function _createNodeIterator(root) {
|
|
return createNodeIterator.call(root.ownerDocument || root, root,
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
|
|
NodeFilter.SHOW_ELEMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION, null);
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* Strip template-engine expressions ({{...}}, ${...}, <%...%>) from the
|
|
* character data of an element subtree. Used as the final safety net for
|
|
* SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES on every DOM-returning code path so that expressions
|
|
* which only form after text-node normalization (e.g. fragments split across
|
|
* stripped elements) cannot survive into a template-evaluating framework.
|
|
*
|
|
* Walks text/comment/CDATA/processing-instruction nodes and mutates `.data`
|
|
* in place rather than round-tripping through innerHTML. This preserves
|
|
* descendant node references (important for IN_PLACE callers), avoids a
|
|
* serialize/reparse cycle, and reads literal character data — which means
|
|
* `<%...%>` in text content matches the ERB regex against its real bytes
|
|
* instead of the HTML-entity-escaped form innerHTML would produce.
|
|
*
|
|
* Attribute values are not visited here; SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES handling for
|
|
* attributes is performed during the per-node `_sanitizeAttributes` pass.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param node The root element whose character data should be scrubbed.
|
|
*/
|
|
const _scrubTemplateExpressions = function _scrubTemplateExpressions(node) {
|
|
node.normalize();
|
|
const walker = createNodeIterator.call(node.ownerDocument || node, node,
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
|
|
NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION, null);
|
|
let currentNode = walker.nextNode();
|
|
while (currentNode) {
|
|
let data = currentNode.data;
|
|
arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR$1, ERB_EXPR$1, TMPLIT_EXPR$1], expr => {
|
|
data = stringReplace(data, expr, ' ');
|
|
});
|
|
currentNode.data = data;
|
|
currentNode = walker.nextNode();
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _isClobbered
|
|
*
|
|
* Detect DOM-clobbering on HTMLFormElement nodes. Form is the only HTML
|
|
* interface with [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]; a descendant element with a
|
|
* `name` attribute matching a prototype property shadows that property
|
|
* on direct reads. We use this check at the IN_PLACE entry-point and
|
|
* during attribute sanitization to refuse clobbered forms.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param element element to check for clobbering attacks
|
|
* @return true if clobbered, false if safe
|
|
*/
|
|
const _isClobbered = function _isClobbered(element) {
|
|
// Realm-independent tag-name probe. If we can't determine the tag
|
|
// name at all, we can't reason about clobbering — return false
|
|
// (the caller's other defences still apply).
|
|
const realTagName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(element) : null;
|
|
if (typeof realTagName !== 'string') {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (transformCaseFunc(realTagName) !== 'form') {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
return typeof element.nodeName !== 'string' || typeof element.textContent !== 'string' || typeof element.removeChild !== 'function' ||
|
|
// Realm-safe NamedNodeMap detection: equality against the cached
|
|
// prototype getter. Clobbered .attributes (e.g. <input name="attributes">)
|
|
// makes the direct read diverge from the cached read; a clean form
|
|
// (same-realm OR foreign-realm) has both reads pointing at the same
|
|
// canonical NamedNodeMap.
|
|
element.attributes !== getAttributes(element) || typeof element.removeAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.setAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.namespaceURI !== 'string' || typeof element.insertBefore !== 'function' || typeof element.hasChildNodes !== 'function' ||
|
|
// NodeType clobbering probe. Cached Node.prototype.nodeType getter
|
|
// returns the integer 1 for any Element regardless of realm; direct
|
|
// read on a clobbered form (e.g. <input name="nodeType">) returns
|
|
// the named child element. Cheap addition — nodeType is read from
|
|
// an internal slot, no serialization cost — and removes a residual
|
|
// clobbering surface used by several mXSS / PI / comment branches
|
|
// in _sanitizeElements that compare currentNode.nodeType directly.
|
|
element.nodeType !== getNodeType(element) ||
|
|
// HTMLFormElement has [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]: a descendant named
|
|
// "childNodes" shadows the prototype getter. Direct reads of
|
|
// form.childNodes from a clobbered form return the named child
|
|
// instead of the real NodeList, so any walk that reads it directly
|
|
// skips the form's real children. Compare the direct read to the
|
|
// cached Node.prototype getter — when the form's named-property
|
|
// getter intercepts the read, the two values differ and we flag
|
|
// the form. This catches every clobbering child type (input,
|
|
// select, etc.) regardless of whether the named child happens to
|
|
// carry a numeric .length, which a typeof-based probe would miss
|
|
// (e.g. HTMLSelectElement.length is a defined unsigned-long).
|
|
element.childNodes !== getChildNodes(element);
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* Checks whether the given value is a DocumentFragment from any realm.
|
|
*
|
|
* The realm-independent replacement reads `nodeType` through the cached
|
|
* Node.prototype getter and compares to the DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE
|
|
* constant (11). nodeType is a numeric value resolved from the node's
|
|
* internal slot, identical across realms for the same kind of node.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param value object to check
|
|
* @return true if value is a DocumentFragment-shaped node from any realm
|
|
*/
|
|
const _isDocumentFragment = function _isDocumentFragment(value) {
|
|
if (!getNodeType || typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
try {
|
|
return getNodeType(value) === NODE_TYPE.documentFragment;
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* Checks whether the given object is a DOM node, including nodes that
|
|
* originate from a different window/realm (e.g. an iframe's
|
|
* contentDocument). The previous `value instanceof Node` check was
|
|
* realm-bound: nodes from a different window failed it, causing
|
|
* sanitize() to silently stringify them and reset IN_PLACE to false,
|
|
* returning the original node unsanitized. See GHSA-4w3q-35jp-p934.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param value object to check whether it's a DOM node
|
|
* @return true if value is a DOM node from any realm
|
|
*/
|
|
const _isNode = function _isNode(value) {
|
|
if (!getNodeType || typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
try {
|
|
return typeof getNodeType(value) === 'number';
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
function _executeHooks(hooks, currentNode, data) {
|
|
arrayForEach(hooks, hook => {
|
|
hook.call(DOMPurify, currentNode, data, CONFIG);
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
/**
|
|
* _sanitizeElements
|
|
*
|
|
* @protect nodeName
|
|
* @protect textContent
|
|
* @protect removeChild
|
|
* @param currentNode to check for permission to exist
|
|
* @return true if node was killed, false if left alive
|
|
*/
|
|
const _sanitizeElements = function _sanitizeElements(currentNode) {
|
|
let content = null;
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
|
|
/* Check if element is clobbered or can clobber */
|
|
if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
|
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Now let's check the element's type and name */
|
|
const tagName = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, currentNode, {
|
|
tagName,
|
|
allowedTags: ALLOWED_TAGS
|
|
});
|
|
/* Detect mXSS attempts abusing namespace confusion */
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.hasChildNodes() && !_isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild) && regExpTest(/<[/\w!]/g, currentNode.innerHTML) && regExpTest(/<[/\w!]/g, currentNode.textContent)) {
|
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Remove risky CSS construction leading to mXSS */
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE && tagName === 'style' && _isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild)) {
|
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Remove any occurrence of processing instructions */
|
|
if (currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.progressingInstruction) {
|
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Remove any kind of possibly harmful comments */
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.comment && regExpTest(/<[/\w]/g, currentNode.data)) {
|
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Remove element if anything forbids its presence */
|
|
if (FORBID_TAGS[tagName] || !(EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName)) && !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName]) {
|
|
/* Check if we have a custom element to handle */
|
|
if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName)) {
|
|
if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(tagName)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Keep content except for bad-listed elements.
|
|
Use the cached prototype getters exclusively — the previous code
|
|
had `|| currentNode.parentNode` / `|| currentNode.childNodes`
|
|
fallbacks, but the cached getters always return the canonical
|
|
value (or null for a real parent-less node), so the fallback
|
|
path was dead in safe cases and a clobbering surface in unsafe
|
|
ones. Falsy cached results stay falsy; the `if (childNodes &&
|
|
parentNode)` check already gates correctly. */
|
|
if (KEEP_CONTENT && !FORBID_CONTENTS[tagName]) {
|
|
const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode);
|
|
const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode);
|
|
if (childNodes && parentNode) {
|
|
const childCount = childNodes.length;
|
|
for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
|
|
const childClone = cloneNode(childNodes[i], true);
|
|
parentNode.insertBefore(childClone, getNextSibling(currentNode));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check whether element has a valid namespace.
|
|
Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use the cached Node.prototype
|
|
nodeType getter rather than `instanceof Element`, which is realm-
|
|
bound and short-circuits to false for any node minted in a different
|
|
realm — letting a foreign-realm element with a forbidden namespace
|
|
slip past the namespace check entirely. */
|
|
const nt = getNodeType ? getNodeType(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeType;
|
|
if (nt === NODE_TYPE.element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) {
|
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Make sure that older browsers don't get fallback-tag mXSS */
|
|
if ((tagName === 'noscript' || tagName === 'noembed' || tagName === 'noframes') && regExpTest(/<\/no(script|embed|frames)/i, currentNode.innerHTML)) {
|
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Sanitize element content to be template-safe */
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.text) {
|
|
/* Get the element's text content */
|
|
content = currentNode.textContent;
|
|
arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR$1, ERB_EXPR$1, TMPLIT_EXPR$1], expr => {
|
|
content = stringReplace(content, expr, ' ');
|
|
});
|
|
if (currentNode.textContent !== content) {
|
|
arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
|
|
element: currentNode.cloneNode()
|
|
});
|
|
currentNode.textContent = content;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
|
|
return false;
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _isValidAttribute
|
|
*
|
|
* @param lcTag Lowercase tag name of containing element.
|
|
* @param lcName Lowercase attribute name.
|
|
* @param value Attribute value.
|
|
* @return Returns true if `value` is valid, otherwise false.
|
|
*/
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line complexity
|
|
const _isValidAttribute = function _isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value) {
|
|
/* FORBID_ATTR must always win, even if ADD_ATTR predicate would allow it */
|
|
if (FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Make sure attribute cannot clobber */
|
|
if (SANITIZE_DOM && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && (value in document || value in formElement)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
const nameIsPermitted = ALLOWED_ATTR[lcName] || EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck(lcName, lcTag);
|
|
/* Allow valid data-* attributes: At least one character after "-"
|
|
(https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#embedding-custom-non-visible-data-with-the-data-*-attributes)
|
|
XML-compatible (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/infrastructure.html#xml-compatible and http://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#d0e804)
|
|
We don't need to check the value; it's always URI safe. */
|
|
if (ALLOW_DATA_ATTR && !FORBID_ATTR[lcName] && regExpTest(DATA_ATTR$1, lcName)) ; else if (ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR && regExpTest(ARIA_ATTR$1, lcName)) ; else if (!nameIsPermitted || FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {
|
|
if (
|
|
// First condition does a very basic check if a) it's basically a valid custom element tagname AND
|
|
// b) if the tagName passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck
|
|
// and c) if the attribute name passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck
|
|
_isBasicCustomElement(lcTag) && (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, lcTag) || CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(lcTag)) && (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck, lcName) || CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck(lcName, lcTag)) ||
|
|
// Alternative, second condition checks if it's an `is`-attribute, AND
|
|
// the value passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck
|
|
lcName === 'is' && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements && (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, value) || CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(value))) ; else {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check value is safe. First, is attr inert? If so, is safe */
|
|
} else if (URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES[lcName]) ; else if (regExpTest(IS_ALLOWED_URI$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE$1, ''))) ; else if ((lcName === 'src' || lcName === 'xlink:href' || lcName === 'href') && lcTag !== 'script' && stringIndexOf(value, 'data:') === 0 && DATA_URI_TAGS[lcTag]) ; else if (ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS && !regExpTest(IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE$1, ''))) ; else if (value) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
} else ;
|
|
return true;
|
|
};
|
|
/* Names the HTML spec reserves from valid-custom-element-name; these must
|
|
* never be treated as basic custom elements even when a permissive
|
|
* CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck is configured. */
|
|
const RESERVED_CUSTOM_ELEMENT_NAMES = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml', 'color-profile', 'font-face', 'font-face-format', 'font-face-name', 'font-face-src', 'font-face-uri', 'missing-glyph']);
|
|
/**
|
|
* _isBasicCustomElement
|
|
* checks if at least one dash is included in tagName, and it's not the first char
|
|
* for more sophisticated checking see https://github.com/sindresorhus/validate-element-name
|
|
*
|
|
* @param tagName name of the tag of the node to sanitize
|
|
* @returns Returns true if the tag name meets the basic criteria for a custom element, otherwise false.
|
|
*/
|
|
const _isBasicCustomElement = function _isBasicCustomElement(tagName) {
|
|
return !RESERVED_CUSTOM_ELEMENT_NAMES[stringToLowerCase(tagName)] && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT$1, tagName);
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _sanitizeAttributes
|
|
*
|
|
* @protect attributes
|
|
* @protect nodeName
|
|
* @protect removeAttribute
|
|
* @protect setAttribute
|
|
*
|
|
* @param currentNode to sanitize
|
|
*/
|
|
const _sanitizeAttributes = function _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode) {
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeAttributes, currentNode, null);
|
|
const attributes = currentNode.attributes;
|
|
/* Check if we have attributes; if not we might have a text node */
|
|
if (!attributes || _isClobbered(currentNode)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
const hookEvent = {
|
|
attrName: '',
|
|
attrValue: '',
|
|
keepAttr: true,
|
|
allowedAttributes: ALLOWED_ATTR,
|
|
forceKeepAttr: undefined
|
|
};
|
|
let l = attributes.length;
|
|
/* Go backwards over all attributes; safely remove bad ones */
|
|
while (l--) {
|
|
const attr = attributes[l];
|
|
const name = attr.name,
|
|
namespaceURI = attr.namespaceURI,
|
|
attrValue = attr.value;
|
|
const lcName = transformCaseFunc(name);
|
|
const initValue = attrValue;
|
|
let value = name === 'value' ? initValue : stringTrim(initValue);
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
hookEvent.attrName = lcName;
|
|
hookEvent.attrValue = value;
|
|
hookEvent.keepAttr = true;
|
|
hookEvent.forceKeepAttr = undefined; // Allows developers to see this is a property they can set
|
|
_executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute, currentNode, hookEvent);
|
|
value = hookEvent.attrValue;
|
|
/* Full DOM Clobbering protection via namespace isolation,
|
|
* Prefix id and name attributes with `user-content-`
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && stringIndexOf(value, SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX) !== 0) {
|
|
// Remove the attribute with this value
|
|
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
// Prefix the value and later re-create the attribute with the sanitized value
|
|
value = SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX + value;
|
|
}
|
|
// Else: already prefixed, leave the attribute alone — the prefix is
|
|
// itself the clobbering protection, and re-applying it is incorrect.
|
|
/* Work around a security issue with comments inside attributes */
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_XML && regExpTest(/((--!?|])>)|<\/(style|script|title|xmp|textarea|noscript|iframe|noembed|noframes)/i, value)) {
|
|
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Make sure we cannot easily use animated hrefs, even if animations are allowed */
|
|
if (lcName === 'attributename' && stringMatch(value, 'href')) {
|
|
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Did the hooks approve of the attribute? */
|
|
if (hookEvent.forceKeepAttr) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Did the hooks approve of the attribute? */
|
|
if (!hookEvent.keepAttr) {
|
|
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Work around a security issue in jQuery 3.0 */
|
|
if (!ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR && regExpTest(/\/>/i, value)) {
|
|
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Sanitize attribute content to be template-safe */
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
|
|
arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR$1, ERB_EXPR$1, TMPLIT_EXPR$1], expr => {
|
|
value = stringReplace(value, expr, ' ');
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
/* Is `value` valid for this attribute? */
|
|
const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
|
|
if (!_isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value)) {
|
|
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Handle attributes that require Trusted Types */
|
|
if (trustedTypesPolicy && typeof trustedTypes === 'object' && typeof trustedTypes.getAttributeType === 'function') {
|
|
if (namespaceURI) ; else {
|
|
switch (trustedTypes.getAttributeType(lcTag, lcName)) {
|
|
case 'TrustedHTML':
|
|
{
|
|
value = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(value);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case 'TrustedScriptURL':
|
|
{
|
|
value = trustedTypesPolicy.createScriptURL(value);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Handle invalid data-* attribute set by try-catching it */
|
|
if (value !== initValue) {
|
|
try {
|
|
if (namespaceURI) {
|
|
currentNode.setAttributeNS(namespaceURI, name, value);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Fallback to setAttribute() for browser-unrecognized namespaces e.g. "x-schema". */
|
|
currentNode.setAttribute(name, value);
|
|
}
|
|
if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
|
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
} else {
|
|
arrayPop(DOMPurify.removed);
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeAttributes, currentNode, null);
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _sanitizeShadowDOM
|
|
*
|
|
* @param fragment to iterate over recursively
|
|
*/
|
|
const _sanitizeShadowDOM2 = function _sanitizeShadowDOM(fragment) {
|
|
let shadowNode = null;
|
|
const shadowIterator = _createNodeIterator(fragment);
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeShadowDOM, fragment, null);
|
|
while (shadowNode = shadowIterator.nextNode()) {
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeShadowNode, shadowNode, null);
|
|
/* Sanitize tags and elements */
|
|
_sanitizeElements(shadowNode);
|
|
/* Check attributes next */
|
|
_sanitizeAttributes(shadowNode);
|
|
/* Deep shadow DOM detected.
|
|
Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use nodeType against the
|
|
DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE constant rather than instanceof, so we
|
|
recurse into <template>.content from foreign realms too. */
|
|
if (_isDocumentFragment(shadowNode.content)) {
|
|
_sanitizeShadowDOM2(shadowNode.content);
|
|
}
|
|
/* An element iterated here may itself host an attached
|
|
shadow root. The default NodeIterator does not enter shadow
|
|
trees, so a shadow root nested inside template.content was
|
|
previously reached by no walk at all (the pre-pass at
|
|
_sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots descends via childNodes, which
|
|
doesn't enter template.content; the template-content recursion
|
|
above iterates the content but never inspected shadowRoot).
|
|
Walk it explicitly. The nodeType guard avoids reading
|
|
shadowRoot off text / comment / CDATA / PI nodes that the
|
|
iterator also surfaces. */
|
|
const shadowNodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(shadowNode) : shadowNode.nodeType;
|
|
if (shadowNodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
|
|
const innerSr = getShadowRoot ? getShadowRoot(shadowNode) : shadowNode.shadowRoot;
|
|
if (_isDocumentFragment(innerSr)) {
|
|
_sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(innerSr);
|
|
_sanitizeShadowDOM2(innerSr);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeShadowDOM, fragment, null);
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots
|
|
*
|
|
* Walks `root` and feeds every attached shadow root we encounter into
|
|
* the existing _sanitizeShadowDOM pipeline. The default node iterator
|
|
* does not descend into shadow trees, so nodes inside an attached
|
|
* shadow root would otherwise be skipped entirely.
|
|
*
|
|
* Two real input paths put attached shadow roots in front of us:
|
|
* 1. IN_PLACE on a DOM node that already has shadow roots attached.
|
|
* 2. DOM-node input where importNode(dirty, true) deep-clones the
|
|
* shadow root because it was created with `clonable: true`.
|
|
*
|
|
* This pass runs once, up front, so the main iteration loop (and the
|
|
* existing _sanitizeShadowDOM template-content recursion) stay
|
|
* untouched — string-input paths are not affected.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param root the subtree root to walk for attached shadow roots
|
|
*/
|
|
const _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2 = function _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(root) {
|
|
const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(root) : root.nodeType;
|
|
if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
|
|
const sr = getShadowRoot ? getShadowRoot(root) : root.shadowRoot;
|
|
// Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use nodeType-based
|
|
// detection rather than `instanceof DocumentFragment`, which is
|
|
// realm-bound and silently skipped shadow roots whose host element
|
|
// belonged to a foreign realm (e.g. iframe.contentDocument
|
|
// attachShadow). A foreign-realm ShadowRoot extends the foreign
|
|
// realm's DocumentFragment, not ours, so the old instanceof check
|
|
// returned false and the shadow subtree was never walked.
|
|
if (_isDocumentFragment(sr)) {
|
|
// Recurse first so that nested shadow roots are reached even if
|
|
// _sanitizeShadowDOM removes hosts at this level.
|
|
_sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(sr);
|
|
_sanitizeShadowDOM2(sr);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Snapshot children before recursing. Sanitization of one subtree
|
|
// (e.g. via an uponSanitizeShadowNode hook) may detach siblings,
|
|
// and naive nextSibling traversal would silently skip the rest of
|
|
// the list once a node is detached.
|
|
const childNodes = getChildNodes ? getChildNodes(root) : root.childNodes;
|
|
if (!childNodes) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
const snapshot = [];
|
|
arrayForEach(childNodes, child => {
|
|
arrayPush(snapshot, child);
|
|
});
|
|
for (const child of snapshot) {
|
|
_sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(child);
|
|
}
|
|
/* When the root is a <template>, also descend into root.content */
|
|
if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
|
|
const rootName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(root) : null;
|
|
if (typeof rootName === 'string' && transformCaseFunc(rootName) === 'template') {
|
|
const content = root.content;
|
|
if (_isDocumentFragment(content)) {
|
|
_sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(content);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line complexity
|
|
DOMPurify.sanitize = function (dirty) {
|
|
let cfg = arguments.length > 1 && arguments[1] !== undefined ? arguments[1] : {};
|
|
let body = null;
|
|
let importedNode = null;
|
|
let currentNode = null;
|
|
let returnNode = null;
|
|
/* Make sure we have a string to sanitize.
|
|
DO NOT return early, as this will return the wrong type if
|
|
the user has requested a DOM object rather than a string */
|
|
IS_EMPTY_INPUT = !dirty;
|
|
if (IS_EMPTY_INPUT) {
|
|
dirty = '<!-->';
|
|
}
|
|
/* Stringify, in case dirty is an object */
|
|
if (typeof dirty !== 'string' && !_isNode(dirty)) {
|
|
dirty = stringifyValue(dirty);
|
|
if (typeof dirty !== 'string') {
|
|
throw typeErrorCreate('dirty is not a string, aborting');
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Return dirty HTML if DOMPurify cannot run */
|
|
if (!DOMPurify.isSupported) {
|
|
return dirty;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Assign config vars */
|
|
if (!SET_CONFIG) {
|
|
_parseConfig(cfg);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Clean up removed elements */
|
|
DOMPurify.removed = [];
|
|
/* Check if dirty is correctly typed for IN_PLACE */
|
|
if (typeof dirty === 'string') {
|
|
IN_PLACE = false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (IN_PLACE) {
|
|
/* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes.
|
|
Read nodeName through the cached prototype getter — a clobbering
|
|
child named "nodeName" on the form root would otherwise shadow
|
|
the property and let this check skip the root-allowlist
|
|
validation entirely. */
|
|
const nn = getNodeName ? getNodeName(dirty) : dirty.nodeName;
|
|
if (typeof nn === 'string') {
|
|
const tagName = transformCaseFunc(nn);
|
|
if (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {
|
|
throw typeErrorCreate('root node is forbidden and cannot be sanitized in-place');
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Pre-flight the root through _isClobbered. The iterator-driven
|
|
removal path can not detach a parent-less root: _forceRemove
|
|
falls through to Element.prototype.remove(), which per spec
|
|
is a no-op on a node with no parent. A clobbered root would
|
|
then survive the main loop with its attributes uninspected,
|
|
because _sanitizeAttributes early-returns on _isClobbered. The
|
|
result would be an attacker-controlled form, complete with any
|
|
event-handler attributes the caller passed in, handed back to
|
|
the application unsanitized. Refuse to sanitize such a root
|
|
the same way we refuse a forbidden tag. GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676. */
|
|
if (_isClobbered(dirty)) {
|
|
throw typeErrorCreate('root node is clobbered and cannot be sanitized in-place');
|
|
}
|
|
/* Sanitize attached shadow roots before the main iterator runs.
|
|
The iterator does not descend into shadow trees. */
|
|
_sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(dirty);
|
|
} else if (_isNode(dirty)) {
|
|
/* If dirty is a DOM element, append to an empty document to avoid
|
|
elements being stripped by the parser */
|
|
body = _initDocument('<!---->');
|
|
importedNode = body.ownerDocument.importNode(dirty, true);
|
|
if (importedNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element && importedNode.nodeName === 'BODY') {
|
|
/* Node is already a body, use as is */
|
|
body = importedNode;
|
|
} else if (importedNode.nodeName === 'HTML') {
|
|
body = importedNode;
|
|
} else {
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-append
|
|
body.appendChild(importedNode);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Clonable shadow roots are deep-cloned by importNode(); sanitize
|
|
them before the main iterator runs, since the iterator does not
|
|
descend into shadow trees. The walk routes every read through a
|
|
cached prototype getter so clobbering descendants on a form root
|
|
cannot hide a shadow host from this pass. */
|
|
_sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(importedNode);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Exit directly if we have nothing to do */
|
|
if (!RETURN_DOM && !SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && !WHOLE_DOCUMENT &&
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-includes
|
|
dirty.indexOf('<') === -1) {
|
|
return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(dirty) : dirty;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Initialize the document to work on */
|
|
body = _initDocument(dirty);
|
|
/* Check we have a DOM node from the data */
|
|
if (!body) {
|
|
return RETURN_DOM ? null : RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? emptyHTML : '';
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Remove first element node (ours) if FORCE_BODY is set */
|
|
if (body && FORCE_BODY) {
|
|
_forceRemove(body.firstChild);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Get node iterator */
|
|
const nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(IN_PLACE ? dirty : body);
|
|
/* Now start iterating over the created document */
|
|
while (currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode()) {
|
|
/* Sanitize tags and elements */
|
|
_sanitizeElements(currentNode);
|
|
/* Check attributes next */
|
|
_sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);
|
|
/* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it.
|
|
Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): nodeType-based detection
|
|
instead of instanceof, so foreign-realm <template>.content is
|
|
walked correctly. */
|
|
if (_isDocumentFragment(currentNode.content)) {
|
|
_sanitizeShadowDOM2(currentNode.content);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* If we sanitized `dirty` in-place, return it. */
|
|
if (IN_PLACE) {
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
|
|
_scrubTemplateExpressions(dirty);
|
|
}
|
|
return dirty;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Return sanitized string or DOM */
|
|
if (RETURN_DOM) {
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
|
|
_scrubTemplateExpressions(body);
|
|
}
|
|
if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
|
|
returnNode = createDocumentFragment.call(body.ownerDocument);
|
|
while (body.firstChild) {
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-append
|
|
returnNode.appendChild(body.firstChild);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
returnNode = body;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ALLOWED_ATTR.shadowroot || ALLOWED_ATTR.shadowrootmode) {
|
|
/*
|
|
AdoptNode() is not used because internal state is not reset
|
|
(e.g. the past names map of a HTMLFormElement), this is safe
|
|
in theory but we would rather not risk another attack vector.
|
|
The state that is cloned by importNode() is explicitly defined
|
|
by the specs.
|
|
*/
|
|
returnNode = importNode.call(originalDocument, returnNode, true);
|
|
}
|
|
return returnNode;
|
|
}
|
|
let serializedHTML = WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? body.outerHTML : body.innerHTML;
|
|
/* Serialize doctype if allowed */
|
|
if (WHOLE_DOCUMENT && ALLOWED_TAGS['!doctype'] && body.ownerDocument && body.ownerDocument.doctype && body.ownerDocument.doctype.name && regExpTest(DOCTYPE_NAME, body.ownerDocument.doctype.name)) {
|
|
serializedHTML = '<!DOCTYPE ' + body.ownerDocument.doctype.name + '>\n' + serializedHTML;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Sanitize final string template-safe */
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
|
|
arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR$1, ERB_EXPR$1, TMPLIT_EXPR$1], expr => {
|
|
serializedHTML = stringReplace(serializedHTML, expr, ' ');
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(serializedHTML) : serializedHTML;
|
|
};
|
|
DOMPurify.setConfig = function () {
|
|
let cfg = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : {};
|
|
_parseConfig(cfg);
|
|
SET_CONFIG = true;
|
|
};
|
|
DOMPurify.clearConfig = function () {
|
|
CONFIG = null;
|
|
SET_CONFIG = false;
|
|
};
|
|
DOMPurify.isValidAttribute = function (tag, attr, value) {
|
|
/* Initialize shared config vars if necessary. */
|
|
if (!CONFIG) {
|
|
_parseConfig({});
|
|
}
|
|
const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(tag);
|
|
const lcName = transformCaseFunc(attr);
|
|
return _isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value);
|
|
};
|
|
DOMPurify.addHook = function (entryPoint, hookFunction) {
|
|
if (typeof hookFunction !== 'function') {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
arrayPush(hooks[entryPoint], hookFunction);
|
|
};
|
|
DOMPurify.removeHook = function (entryPoint, hookFunction) {
|
|
if (hookFunction !== undefined) {
|
|
const index = arrayLastIndexOf(hooks[entryPoint], hookFunction);
|
|
return index === -1 ? undefined : arraySplice(hooks[entryPoint], index, 1)[0];
|
|
}
|
|
return arrayPop(hooks[entryPoint]);
|
|
};
|
|
DOMPurify.removeHooks = function (entryPoint) {
|
|
hooks[entryPoint] = [];
|
|
};
|
|
DOMPurify.removeAllHooks = function () {
|
|
hooks = _createHooksMap();
|
|
};
|
|
return DOMPurify;
|
|
}
|
|
var purify = createDOMPurify();
|
|
|
|
export { purify as default };
|
|
//# sourceMappingURL=purify.es.mjs.map
|