Void-Homelab/docs/security-sweep-2026-06-01.md

Void 2.0 — Security Sweep (2026-06-01, alpha.6)

Fresh security pass over the live alpha.6 surfaces. Severity is for the current deployment context: single owner token, owner-only authn, one suggest-tier companion agent, LAN + Cloudflare-Access perimeter. Several items move up in severity once additional agents or wider exposure land.

Legend: ✅ fixed this pass · 🔧 recommended (needs your call / migration) · ℹ️ note.

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✅ FIXED — Owner token compared in non-constant time (was MEDIUM)

lib/auth/owner.js and lib/api/middleware/agent_auth.js compared the bearer token with === / !==. String === short-circuits on the first differing byte, leaking token length and prefix through response timing — over enough samples this enables byte-by-byte recovery of OWNER_TOKEN.

Fix: new lib/auth/timingSafeStrEqual (constant-time via crypto.timingSafeEqual with a length pre-check so it never throws on a length mismatch). Both auth paths now use it. Tests: tests/auth/safe_compare.test.js.

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🔧 HIGH — verifyToken does an O(n) bcrypt scan over every token

lib/db/repos/agents.js::verifyToken loads all non-revoked agent tokens and runs bcrypt.compare against each (cost factor 12 ≈ 250 ms/compare).

• Auth latency scales linearly with token count. With N agents/tokens, every authenticated request pays N bcrypt comparisons.
• DoS lever: an attacker who can hit an authenticated endpoint with a vk_- prefixed token forces a full-table bcrypt scan per request.

Recommended fix (needs a migration — left for your sign-off): give each token a non-secret lookup key. Store token_id = first 8 chars of the random body (or a separate indexed selector column), index it, and bcrypt.compare exactly the one row it points at. Keeps bcrypt's offline-cracking resistance while making verification O(1). This is the standard "selector + verifier" split.

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🔧 HIGH — void DB role still has SUPERUSER (carried over)

Documented in security-followups.md: the void role was granted SUPERUSER so the test harness could CREATE EXTENSION. On prod (CT 311 → CT 310 DB) this is far more privilege than the app needs. Revoke on prod; create extensions once as a superuser during bootstrap, then run the app as a non-superuser role.

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🔧 MEDIUM — Companion subprocess inherits the full server environment

lib/ai/claude_cli.js clones process.env for the claude child and only deletes ANTHROPIC_API_KEY / ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN. The child therefore also inherits OWNER_TOKEN, DB_PASS/connection strings, and the Karakeep secrets.

Today the companion is constrained to mcp__void__* tools only (built-ins like Bash/Read are stripped via --tools), so it has no primitive to read its own env — contained in practice. But it is one config slip (re-enabling a built-in) away from full secret exposure.

Recommended (defense in depth): pass an explicit allow-list env to the child (HOME, PATH, the few CLAUDE_* / VOID_CLAUDE_HOME vars, and only the MCP server's own needs) rather than the whole environment.

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ℹ️ LOW — context tool returns SELECT * of the active entity

lib/ai/agent/tools/context.js returns every column of the active row to the agent. For resources that includes monitoring/metadata JSON, which may hold connection hints or vault_path pointers. Not a secret-value leak today (the resolver keeps values out of the row), but project a column allow-list before Yerin (or any future agent) queries resource rows broadly.

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✅ Reviewed and sound (no action)

• SSRF guard (lib/ingest/safe_fetch.js): http/https-only, blocks loopback / RFC1918 / link-local / CGNAT(100.64) / 0.0.0.0 / IPv6 ULA+link-local+v4-mapped, validates all DNS records, pins resolved IPs into the undici dispatcher to defeat TOCTOU rebinding, and re-validates every redirect hop. Solid.
• Karakeep webhook HMAC (lib/api/routes/ingest.js): timingSafeEqual over the raw body, guarded against length-mismatch throw, fails closed on missing secret/sig. Good.
• Audit redaction (lib/db/repos/audit.js): redacts token/password/api_key/ secret/authorization recursively at write time.
• Capability model (lib/auth/capability.js): agents default-deny; mutations require write+scope or fall to suggest; unknown actions deny.
• XSS: safe-DOM invariant in public/dom.js; assistant markdown only via the DOMPurify-sanitized path.
• Bearer-only API (no cookies) ⇒ CSRF not applicable.

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Carried-over from security-followups.md (design decisions, your call)

• [HIGH] Polymorphic entity_tags/entity_links/attachments lack space_id (cross-tenant linkage possible at the DB layer). Defensible for single-tenant alpha; gate at the REST/MCP layer until multi-tenant is load-bearing.
• [MEDIUM] tags.name UNIQUE is global, not per-space.
• [MEDIUM] No cascade on polymorphic parent delete.