verifyToken loaded every non-revoked token and bcrypt-compared each (O(n) per request — auth-latency DoS + linear scaling). New token format vk_<selector>.<verifier>: the non-secret selector is indexed and locates exactly one row; only the verifier is bcrypt-hashed. Legacy NULL-selector tokens still verify via a fallback scan. Dropped the useless idx_agent_tokens_hash. - migration 010_token_selector.sql (adds selector col + unique partial index) - createToken/verifyToken reworked; also adds listTokenMeta (read for Yerin's token_audit tool) - tests/repos/token_selector.test.js Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
117 lines
4.0 KiB
JavaScript
117 lines
4.0 KiB
JavaScript
import crypto from 'node:crypto';
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import bcrypt from 'bcrypt';
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import { pool } from '../pool.js';
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import { recordAudit } from './audit_stub.js';
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const FIELDS = ['slug','name','kind','model','persona_path','capabilities','scopes'];
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export async function create(input, actor) {
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const cols = [], vals = [], ph = [];
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let i = 1;
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for (const f of FIELDS) {
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if (input[f] !== undefined) { cols.push(f); vals.push(input[f]); ph.push(`$${i++}`); }
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}
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const { rows: [r] } = await pool.query(
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`INSERT INTO agents(${cols.join(',')}) VALUES(${ph.join(',')}) RETURNING *`,
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vals
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);
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await recordAudit(actor, 'create', 'agent', r.id, null, r);
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return r;
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}
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export async function getById(id) {
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const { rows: [r] } = await pool.query(`SELECT * FROM agents WHERE id=$1`, [id]);
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return r;
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}
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export async function getBySlug(slug) {
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const { rows: [r] } = await pool.query(`SELECT * FROM agents WHERE slug=$1`, [slug]);
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return r;
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}
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export async function list() {
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const { rows } = await pool.query(`SELECT * FROM agents ORDER BY name`);
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return rows;
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}
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export async function setCapabilities(id, capabilities, scopes) {
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const { rows: [r] } = await pool.query(
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`UPDATE agents SET capabilities=$1, scopes=$2 WHERE id=$3 RETURNING *`,
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[capabilities, scopes || {}, id]
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);
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return r;
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}
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// Token format: vk_<selector>.<verifier>
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// selector — non-secret, indexed, locates exactly one row (O(1))
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// verifier — the secret; only this is bcrypt-hashed into token_hash
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// base64url never contains '.', so the delimiter is unambiguous.
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export async function createToken(agent_id, label) {
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const selector = crypto.randomBytes(9).toString('base64url'); // ~12 chars
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const verifier = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'); // ~43 chars
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const plaintext = `vk_${selector}.${verifier}`;
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const token_hash = await bcrypt.hash(verifier, 12);
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const { rows: [t] } = await pool.query(
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`INSERT INTO agent_tokens(agent_id, label, token_hash, selector) VALUES($1,$2,$3,$4) RETURNING id`,
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[agent_id, label || null, token_hash, selector]
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);
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return { token: plaintext, id: t.id };
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}
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const AGENT_SELECT =
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`SELECT t.id, t.token_hash, t.agent_id, a.*
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FROM agent_tokens t JOIN agents a ON a.id = t.agent_id`;
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async function finalizeVerify(row, secret) {
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if (await bcrypt.compare(secret, row.token_hash)) {
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await pool.query(`UPDATE agent_tokens SET last_used=now() WHERE id=$1`, [row.id]);
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const { token_hash, selector, ...agent } = row;
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return agent;
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}
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return null;
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}
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export async function verifyToken(plaintext) {
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if (!plaintext?.startsWith('vk_')) return null;
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const rest = plaintext.slice(3);
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const dot = rest.indexOf('.');
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if (dot !== -1) {
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// New format — single indexed lookup by selector, bcrypt the verifier only.
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const selector = rest.slice(0, dot);
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const verifier = rest.slice(dot + 1);
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const { rows: [row] } = await pool.query(
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`${AGENT_SELECT} WHERE t.selector = $1 AND t.revoked_at IS NULL`, [selector]
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);
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if (!row) return null;
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return finalizeVerify(row, verifier);
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}
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// Legacy fallback — pre-migration tokens hashed the full plaintext and have
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// no selector. Scan only the (shrinking) NULL-selector set.
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const { rows } = await pool.query(
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`${AGENT_SELECT} WHERE t.selector IS NULL AND t.revoked_at IS NULL`
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);
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for (const row of rows) {
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const agent = await finalizeVerify(row, plaintext);
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if (agent) return agent;
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}
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return null;
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}
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export async function revokeToken(token_id) {
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await pool.query(`UPDATE agent_tokens SET revoked_at=now() WHERE id=$1`, [token_id]);
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}
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// Token metadata for security review — label/usage/revocation joined with the
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// owning agent. NEVER selects token_hash.
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export async function listTokenMeta() {
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const { rows } = await pool.query(
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`SELECT t.id, t.agent_id, a.slug AS agent_slug, a.name AS agent_name,
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t.label, t.last_used, t.created_at, t.revoked_at
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FROM agent_tokens t JOIN agents a ON a.id = t.agent_id
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ORDER BY t.created_at DESC`
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);
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return rows;
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}
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